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GULF OF VENEZUELA: BORDER DISPUTE
ARTHUR M. BIRKEN*
INTRODUCTION
Two segments of the Gulf of Venezuela are the subject of serious
controversy between Venezuela and Colombia. These areas represent a
relatively small number of square miles, but the possibility of the exist-
ence of petroleum deposits appears to have created a potentially volatile
situation. Efforts made by the two governments to arrive at a settlement
through the traditional means of bilateral negotiations appear to have
reached a stalemate.
The Gulf of Venezuela is located at the northernmost boundary of
the two countries. The Paraguana Peninsula, under the sovereignty of
Venezuela, is at the eastern end of the Gulf. The Guajira Peninsula, part
of which is under Venezuelan sovereignty and part under Colombian
sovereignty, is at the western extremity of the Gulf. The dispute centers
upon the delimitation of the water boundary between the two countries,
as the boundary is extended from the Guajira Peninsula. Territorial sea
and continental shelf problems are involved. The other area of controversy
involves Los Monges Islands, three tiny groups of three islands per group
situated 18 miles off the northeast coast of Colombia. Here the major
problem is the extent of territorial sea to which the islands are entitled.
This paper will provide the background of the controversy, and then
suggest what will hopefully break the stalemate and prove an effective,
albeit unorthodox, method of settling the dispute to the satisfaction of
both parties.
*B.A., New York University; J.D., Washington College of Law.
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BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
Under the leadership of Sim6n Bolivar, the present day Colombia
and Venezuela secured their independence from Spain in 1820 and were
united under one flag for a ten-year period. In 1830, it was decided to
divide into two countries, the Republic of New Grenada (now Colombia)
and the Republic of Venezuela. The first attempt to delimit the common
boundaries was made in 1833 and the result was the Pombo Michelena
Treaty, signed on December 14, 1833, in Bogoti.1 The borders of the
States were to be based on the Spanish maps which had, in 1810, divided
the territory of New Grenada from the Captaincy General of Venezuela.2
However, at the time the treaty was negotiated, both States lacked ade-
quate maps plus necessary geographical and historical information on the
Guajira Peninsula. Article 27 of the treaty divided the Guajira Peninsula
at the Cape of Chichivacoa, which meant that Venezuela was the only
State with territory bordering the Gulf of Venezuela. Colombia, anxious
to reach a final settlement had been willing to refrain from claiming
the Guajira believing it to be of little strategic or economic value. The
treaty was ratified by the Colombian Congress but rejected by the Vene-
zuelan Congress which, despite a favorable committee report, believed
Venezuela surrendered too much territory.
4
In 1844 another attempt was made to settle the borders. Colombia
submitted maps discovered after 1833 which purported to give Colombia
clear title to land in the Guajira Peninsula awarded to Venezuela by the
1833 treaty.5 Venezuela steadfastly refused to concede any territory to
Colombia and the negotiations ended with Colombia proposing and Vene-
zuela rejecting the arbitration.
In 1872, Venezuela turned down a new Colombian arbitration sug-
gestion. Numerous border incidents occurred and due in part to the
boundary controversy, diplomatic relations were broken off in 1872 and
again from 1875 to 1880.6
Venezuela finally consented to arbitration by the King of Spain in
1881 and ten years later a judgment was rendered.7 Venezuela was
unhappy with the decision and ignored it by claiming that execution of
the award required parliamentary action which was not taken.8 In 1898,
Venezuela and Colombia agreed to establish a Joint Commission to
demarcate the boundary pursuant to the 1891 arbitral decision. Problems
were to be submitted to the two governments for decision. However, by
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1901 the difficulties were so numerous that the Commission suspended
its work after fixing the limits on only part of the boundary.9 One item
that thc Commission was able to settle was the amount of territory in
the Guajira Peninsula that Colombia was entitled to. Colombia was
awarded all of the Guijara north of the town of Castilletes, a 5,000 square
kilometer difference in territory from that negotiated in 1833.
Colombia was not allowed to take formal possession of the Guajira
Peninsula and in 1916 the Swiss Federal Council was asked to arbitrate.
In 1922 it stated that the 1891 arbitration was binding and Colombia
should immediately take possession of territory to which it was entitled.
The Swiss arbitration said nothing about territorial sea rights, but since
Colombia was given land bordering the Gulf, it must be understood that
it was entitled to a territorial sea in the Gulf.
Bitterly disappointed with the Swiss arbitration, Venezuela waited
until 1941 to formally accept the decision. The "Treaty on the Demarca-
tion of Frontiers and Navigation of the Common Rivers between Colombia
and Venezuela"' was thought to be a final settlement of all common
boundaries. However, this treaty failed to discuss how to delimit the
Gulf of Venezuela, which if settled in 1941, would not now, more than
thirty years later, provide a vexing and sensitive problem for the two
countries. Rights to the subsoil on the Continental Shelf and extensions
of the territorial sea from three to twelve miles were of little concern
in 1941, since the likelihood of petroleum in the Gulf had not been
raised, and settlement should have been relatively simple.
In 1952, Colombia formally recognized the Venezuelan sovereignty
over Los Monges, three groups of three tiny barren islands per group,
approximately nineteen miles east of the coast of Colombia in the Gulf
of Venezuela. 11 If there were any anticipated boundary problems in the
Gulf of Venezuela in 1952, Colombia would not want to take any action
that would create new difficulties by recognizing Venezuelan sovereignty
over Los Monges and then find it necessary to worry about the extent
of Los Monges' territorial sea. As recently as 1952 there simply was no
concern over territorial sea problems in the Gulf.
By 1965, however, the existence of problems concerning the delimita-
tion of the Gulf were recognized and the first meeting was held to attempt
to decide the border. Factors involved in the evolution of this into a
sensitive dispute are the illegal immigration of 300,000 Colombians into
Venezuela; the fact that all known Venezuelan petroleum deposits were
under production by 1963; and the fact that it was necessary for Colombia
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to import almost all of its petroleum. In 1970, the negotiations were
moved to Rome to avoid leaks to the press which might handicap the
arrival at a final solution.
As mentioned earlier, the disputes are in two specific areas. The first
is how to draw the imaginary boundary line into the Gulf from the town
of Castilletes. The basic Venezuelan claim is that the existing boundary
line should be extended directly into the Gulf. Colombia argues that the
proper method of delimitation would be for the boundary to be the point
equally distant from the coast of each country. The other area of dis-
agreement involves the amount of territorial sea that Los Monges should
be entitled to. Venezuela claims that Los Monges should be entitled to a
territorial sea that extends to the point equally distant from the islands
and the Colombian coast, while Colombia says that since the islands are
tiny and are virtually uninhabited, they should be limited to a maximum
territorial sea equal to approximately 7 miles, the amount of distance
left after Colombia gets her full 12-mile territorial sea.
International conventions, namely the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone12 and the Convention on the Continental
Shelf' 3 were negotiated at Geneva in April 1958, and each has provi-
sions, which if applied, would settle the dispute. However, Colombia did
not ratify the Territorial Sea Convention which it felt might be used
against its interests with regard to Los Monges. Venezuela, although rati-
fying the rest of the treaty, made a reservation to Article XII stating
that there may be special circumstances in the Gulf of Venezuela. Art.
XII states:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each
other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement
between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond
the median line every point of which is equidistant from the near-
est points on the baselines from which the breadth of the terri-
torial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions
of this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary
by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit
the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance
with this provision.
14
The Convention on the Continental Shelf has been ratified by Colom-
bia. Venezuela ratified with a reservation to Article VI (2) which reserves
to Venezuela the right to make changes in negotiations on the demarca-
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tion of intermarine and submarine areas of the Gulf of Venezuela.s
Art. VI (2) states:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of
two or more States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall
be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application
of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
State is measured. 16
The Territorial Sea Convention and the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion thus may not be applied in this case since relevant articles of those
instruments have not been accepted unequivocally by either Venezuela
or Colombia. Furthermore, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands), the
International Court of Justice rejected contentions that Art. VI of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf had acquired sufficient worldwide
acceptance to make it a rule of international law binding on states which
had not accepted the Convention or that particular article.17
The situation as it exists today is a stalemate. Bilateral negotiations
have failed to lead to a solution; applicable treaties may not be employed
because of reservations or nonratifications; there is no accepted customary
international law formula to apply; and Venezuela refuses to accept arbi-
tration because of the distasteful decisions of 1891 and 1922. There has
been at least one very serious border incident in the past few years and
some action should be taken before the situation becomes worse. The
balance of this paper will explore the advisability of establishing a
binational authority as a means of breaking the stalemate and reaching
an amicable solution.
THE BINATIONAL AND THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED
DOMESTIC AUTHORITY
There are a number of government-owned domestic, binational and
multinational authorities, commissions and corporations in existence today.
It should be useful to examine certain aspects of the composition, powers
and duties of some of these as a guide in forming a binational authority
in Venezuela and Colombia.
GULF OF VENEZUELA: BORDER DISPUTE
A. River Authorities
Navigation of the Rhine, Danube, Scheldt, Oder, Elbe, Po and Pruth
rivers have at different times during the past century and a half been
administered by international bodies,18 made up of both littoral and user
states. Frequently these bodies have been able to settle disputes among
the littoral states or between the littoral states and the nonriparian users.19
The Central Commission of the Rhine, with headquarters in Strass-
bourg, has authority to act in all matters relating to navigation of the
Rhine. It consists of an unequal number of representatives of each mem-
ber state with each representative allotted one vote20 (France has five
votes and five representatives, Germany four votes and four representa-
tives, Netherlands, Switzerland, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium have two
each).21 Majority vote governs, but for a decision to be binding upon a
riparian member, consent of the riparian must be obtained. Decisions are
enforced by inspectors with disputes among inspectors submitted to the
Commission. 22 The Rhine Commission is still in operation.
The European Commission of the Danube, also concerned primarily
with navigation, has lost much vitality since the end of World War II
when the bulk of the Danube came under Russian control. Prior to that
time, it was composed of one representative from France, Great Britain,
Italy and Roumania. In routine matters, decisions were made by majority
rule, while important questions required unanimity.23
B. Domestic Government-Owned Corporation
The Tennessee Valley Authority was established by the United States
Congress in 1933,24 to administer public works and their byproducts
(electricity, fertilizers) in the Tennessee River Region. Certain aspects
of this Authority will be discussed here because of their possible applica-
tion in Venezuela and Colombia. Unlike the river commissions, the TVA
does not operate on a break-even theory; it is allowed to make a profit.
It is set up along the lines of a corporation with a three-man Board of
Directors appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate,
to nine-year terms. The directors are required to refrain from participa-
tion in any other business, and they may not have an interest in a
business that may be adversely affected by the success of the corporation. 25
Capital may be raised through the issuance of United States Government
guaranteed bonds.26
However, the structure of the Authority created many organizational
problems. The directors were given broad leeway by Congress with regard
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to the delegation of power. Originally, the Chairman of the Board was
given the duties of chief administrator in charge of day-to-day operations.
This lasted exactly two months when the other directors demanded a
greater participation in day-to-day affairs. Next was a division of respon-
sibility among the three directors of each phase of the TVA program,
each making recommendations as to policy, personnel and budget in his
area to the other directors.27 This structure also failed, finally giving
way to a General Manager, appointed by the Board of Directors, in
charge of day-to-day operations while the Board of Directors was left
to formulate general policy.28
C. Boundary Commissions
The International Boundary Commission was created to carry out
the provisions of the treaties of 1848, 1853, 1882, 1884, and 1905 between
the United States and Mexico. 29 Each country appoints one commissioner
and each commissioner has equal authority.30 "The Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction between the United States and Mexico . . . (and)
is empowered: to suspend the construction of works of any character
along the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers that contravene existing
treaties; to erect and maintain monuments along the boundary; to make
necessary surveys of changes brought by force of the current in both
rivers."31 If the Commissioners concur on a decision, it is binding on
both the United States and Mexico unless either country shall disapprove
it expressly within thirty days. If a decision is disapproved the Govern-
ments shall decide the question amicably. When the Commissioners are
unable to agree, the Governments may attempt to solve the problem in
any manner they choose.32
The Commission operates on an ad hoe basis with meetings held
when needed. There is no specific timetable. Each country has its own
organization which it controls and pays for. "The Commission as such
may be said to have an organization only in the sense that there are
joint meetings and often joint activities such as surveys in the field. ...
There are not even any joint offices." 33
In the Chamizal dispute, the Rio Grande changed course so that six
hundred acres that had been on the Mexican side of the river shifted to
the United States, placing in issue the ownership of the land. The Com-
missioners were unable to decide, and neither of the two Governments
would concede the land. The United States rejected a Mexican proposal
to draft a treaty on the subject, but eventually accepted a Mexican sug-
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gestion to expand the International Boundary Commission to include a
third member. The suggestion also sought to expand the Commission's
powers by making its decisions binding and not subject to rejection within
the thirty days by either Government. The United States refused to
accept a decision rendered in favor of Mexico, claiming it went beyond
the compromise. However, this was a useful example, for purposes of
this paper, of altering existing machinery to fit altered circumstances.
The dispute was finally settled in 1963.
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 established the International
Joint Commission between Canada and the United States. The Commis.
sion is run by six Commissioners (three from each country)3 4 who meet
a minimum of two times per year, once in Washington and once in
Ottawa. Decisions are made by majority vote and when the Commissioners
cannot agree, the dispute is submitted to each Government for further
attempts to settle the controversy.35
One important function of the Commission is to decide questions
involving the use of boundary waters and rivers flowing across the
boundary.3 6
Under Art. IX of the 1909 Treaty, differences involving the rights,
obligations or interests of either country or their inhabitants along the
common frontier between the United States and Canada, shall be referred
to the International Joint Commission whenever either the United States
or Canada so requests.37 When requests under Art. IX are made, the
Commission is empowered to examine the Jacts, reach a conclusion, report
upon the facts, and make whatever recommendations are deemed appro.
priate. 38 The powers granted by Art. IX are exclusively powers of investi-
gation and recommendation, and not of arbitration.
Art. X states that any questions between Canada and the United
States involving their rights, obligations, or interests either in relation
to each other or to their respective inhabitants may be referred to the
International Joint Commission if there is consent by both parties.
39
Art. X goes beyond Art. IX, for once a conclusion is reached, "it is
made for decision and not only, as in the case of Art. IX, for examina-
tion and report." 40 Permission to arbitrate must be given by the United
States Senate.41 Art. X may encompass more problems than Art. IX for
it is not limited, as is Art. IX, to disputes along the common frontier.
Theoretically, Art. X may be used in any bilateral dispute, however, it
has never been employed.
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Day-to-day handling of various projects supervised by the Commis-
sion have led to the creation of International Boards of Control consisting
of two engineers (one from each country). The Boards report directly to
the Commission and in the event of disagreement between the members,
problems are referred back to the Commission.42
A discussion of the St. Lawrence Seaway was not included in the
subsection on River Authorities because its relationship to the Inter-
national Joint Commission is of such a close nature that its study should
accompany the examination of the International Joint Commission. "The
International Joint Commission . . . is responsible for all matters con-
cerning the boundary waters between Canada and the United States.
* . . It was the medium through which the Seaway and Power Projects
were launched." 43
In 1932, the United States Senate rejected a treaty between Canada
and the United States to pay for the construction of a St. Lawrence Sea-
way. Canada eventually authorized its agencies to build the Seaway itself,
if necessary. If Canada built the entire Seaway it would have had com-
plete control of the waterway and the amount to be charged for tolls,
despite the fact that the United States would provide the bulk of the
shipping. The Canadian action spurred Congress to pass the Wiley-
Dondero Act of 1954, creating the St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation to construct and operate the works needed on the United
States side of the river. The Canadian-operated St. Lawrence Seaway
Authority built the works needed on the Canadian side. What now exists
is a unique situation, namely two national authorities with coordinated
activities, operating distinct sections of the St. Lawrence Seaway in co-
operation with each other.
"The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation is a public
corporation, managed by an Administrator appointed by the President.'"
General policies, however, and the fixing of tolls, is the responsibility of
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce.45 The corresponding Canadian institu-
tion, the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, consists of three members with
total control over navigation, tolls and maintenance. 46
Involvement of the International Joint Commission has occurred, not
where there were improvements made on either side of the river for that
was not covered by the 1909 Convention, but rather where facilities were
needed for generation of hydroelectric power.
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PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE
The border dispute between Colombia and Venezuela concerning the
Gulf of Venezuela has been discussed since 1965 by representatives of
the two Governments. Negotiations over a seven-year period have not
produced a settlement. Existing pertinent international conventions have
not been ratified, or else have been ratified with reservations to key
provisions. Arbitration has been, and is likely to continue to be, rejected
by Venezuela because of the unfavorable results of past arbitrations and
the fear that history will repeat itself. If the controversy is going to be
settled, a new approach is needed. There is precedent in Venezuela and
Colombia for establishing a bilateral authority to settle disputes. A short
lived mixed boundary commission was set up in 1898 to enforce the 1891
arbitration of the King of Spain. Furthermore, as the entire second part
of this paper demonstrated, there exists a variety of binational, multi-
national and domestic government controlled bodies charged with settling
problems between countries, or improving the lot of persons on its borders.
These bodies may serve as models for settlement of this controversy.
Many of these authorities have operated for long periods of time with
great success. The author believes that the creation of the two binational
bodies which will be explained in detail shortly, provides a realistic and
practical method of ending the current dispute and dealing with problems
which may arise in the future.
One reasonable assumption must be made, namely, that the disposition
of the petroleum which may exist in the area of controversy is the key
to the problem. Colombia lacks substantial petroleum deposits and must
import most of its oil needs. It greatly desires a new accessible source
of petroleum and also the revenue which comes from leasing oil rights.
Venezuelan citizens were incensed at the 1941 treaty with Colombia which
saw Venezuela relinquish its claims to the entire Guajira Peninsula, and
there appears to be apprehension within the government that a further
surrender of territorial claims to land which might contain petroleum
would arouse public feeling to such a frenzied pitch that the government
might lose the next election. There was no problem about ownership of
the Gulf until the possibility of the existence of petroleum was raised.
Therefore, it will be necessary to deal with the petroleum problem in a
manner acceptable to both countries.
The first Authority that the author suggests be created is a Border
Commission similar to the International Joint Commission and the Inter-
national Boundary Commission. The Border Commission would be charged
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with settling all boundary problems that arise between the two countries.
In the present dispute, the Commission would seek to define the specific
demands of each country and attempt to persuade each to make terri-
torial concessions. When the point is reached where both Venezuela and
Colombia are totally inflexible and there are still areas where the claims
of each country overlap, the two countries should, at least temporarily,
agree to disagree as to the sovereignty of the areas claimed by both
countries. Any concessions should be finalized so that at least some sec-
tions of the Gulf, whose sovereignty is in doubt, may be settled.
The areas where the parties agreed to disagree should then be
brought under the control of a binational, government controlled cor-
poration whose business would be to administer oil leasing in that area,
and to divide profits. If no oil was found by those who purchased explora-
tion rights, the corporation would dissolve and the Border Commission
might then be able to settle the sovereignty of contested areas of the
Gulf inasmuch as the existing strong emotions the controversy (petroleum)
engenders would have dissipated.
The type of organization chosen would, if adopted, be simple, equit-
able and inexpensive. Simplicity is a very important element on the
premise that the more complex the organizations, the greater the possi-
bility of disputes which could wreck them.
It would not be feasible to attempt to model an organization after the
St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation, for while it is desirable for each
country to administer its own territory, there would be no way of deter.
mining which country owns what territory. The method chosen by-passes
the question of ownership, yet it allows any existing petroleum to be
extracted with profits accruing to each country. The fear that territory
relinquished might prove valuable has been a major obstacle to settle-
ment, but this problem can be avoided by having both countries share
in the profits if any petroleum is found.
In all the entities previously examined, with the exception of the
Central Commission of the Rhine, there has been equality of the members
in representation and in voting. Neither Venezuela nor Colombia would
consent to being the junior member of a binational authority; total
equality of parties must exist. There is no apparent reason why either
country would demand control over either the Border Commission, which
would seek to define areas of agreement and disagreement, or of the
Corporation, which would merely grant leases to the highest bidder in
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defined territory. Equality would also be maintained in matters of profits
and expenses.
Unlike the Authorities discussed previously (with the exception of
the TVA), the Corporation would be a profit making enterprise. Resort-
ing to a newly created government-run corporation, rather than existing
government-owned oil companies, would avoid possible conflicts between
competitive oil companies with regard to the grant of exploration rights.
The government-owned companies may have an interest in reserving
sections of the territory in controversy for themselves, and their impar-
tiality would be open to question. Also, it would be preferable to keep
the government-owned companies of Venezuela and Colombia outside of
the Corporation and not let them bid for exploration rights due to the
speculative nature of oil exploration. If one company had a lease and
struck oil, it could lead to a rekindling of ill feelings, and destroy the
corporation.
The idea of creating a corporation with ownership by both govern-
ments to conduct its own explorations and its own drilling was rejected
because the amount of capital needed would be very high, and the
possibility that oil would be discovered was not assured. Also, such a
company would entail the creation of a complex organization and gen-
erate numerous problems which could destroy the chances of a settlement.
It is believed to be more desirable to sell the exploration rights to existing
oil companies and enjoy a guaranteed profit, than to take a chance with
exploration and possibly make nothing. The prospect of having to furnish
large amounts of capital for exploration does not appear to be an incen-
tive to settle the dispute, especially since lending institutions are reluctant,
at best, to grant loans for something as speculative as wildcatting, and
expenses would all have to be out of pocket.
The costs and expenses of the organizations suggested would be
minimal. The Border Commissioners would receive a salary, but would
need only small staffs, with technical information provided either by the
respective governments themselves, or by consultants hired by the Com-
mission. The Corporation's expenses would also be quite low, for the
most expensive items would probably be salaries. The Corporation would
be virtually assured of being a profit making enterprise, even if oil was
not discovered, for the amounts paid for exploration rights should more
than cover operating expenses. It would not be necessary for the Cor-
poration to receive a loan to operate, and some profits could even be used
to pay the expenses of the Border Commission.
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If the dispute was settled by a means other than the establishment
of a Corporation to control oil exploration, namely through negotiations
or arbitration, and oil was later discovered, this could create much un-
necessary friction between the two governments. A corporation would
avoid ill feeling because all profits would be shared. Half a loaf is better
than no bread at all, and this should be recognized by both Colombia and
Venezuela.
The Border Commission should consist of two Commissioners, one
from Colombia and one from Venezuela, rather than have many repre-
sentatives from each country. There does not seem to be a good reason
for having three representatives as there are on the International Joint
Commission. Countries normally vote as a bloc, and whether the vote is
three to three, or one to one, the effect is the same. Furthermore, it is
cheaper to operate with only one representative.
The Border Commission should be given automatic jurisdiction over
all boundary controversies and the power to make binding decisions,
unless specifically rejected by either country within a set period of time
as is done by the International Boundary Commission. There should be
no objection to this since the Commissioners may be expected to reflect
the positions of their respective governments, and unlikely to take posi-
tions not acceptable to them. If a Commissioner did act contra to the
wishes of his government, the country would have a set period of time
to remedy the situation.
It may also be desirable for the Border Commission to be given the
power to arbitrate, at the request of both parties, any dispute which may
arise between the two countries as per Art. X of the International Joint
Commission's implementing legislation. As long as consent to each arbitra-
tion is mandatory, this should not be objectionable to Venezuela, which
is adverse to arbitration.
The Border Commission would provide ongoing machinery to settle
disputes of any type which may arise and thus avoid the necessity of
creating ad hoc entities to resolve conflicts. If the Border Commission
could not arrive at a satisfactory solution, as could be the case in the
Gulf of Venezuela, the dispute would be referred back to the respective
governments for action, as is done in the International Joint Commission
and the International Boundary Commission.
It is said that the border dispute in the Gulf of Venezuela is the last
boundary difference between Venezuela and Colombia. If that is the case,
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it may be argued that a Permanent Border Commission is unnecessary.
However, when the treaty of 1941 was signed, it was believed that there
were no more boundary problems, but in 1952, Colombia found it neces-
sary to recognize, formally, Venezuelan sovereignty over Los Monges,
and in 1965 this dispute came into prominence. It is very possible that
once this boundary is settled, another dispute will arise and it will be
helpful to have existing machinery to deal with it.
The Corporation should be run by a Board of Trustees to formulate
the general policies of the Corporation. This would be similar to the
structure of the TVA. There should be an equal number of Colombians
and Venezuelans, and the trustees should be experts in petroleum and
financial matters. The presiding officer at the meetings of the Corporation
should be alternatively from Venezuela and Colombia. Similarly to the
TVA, the trustees should have no other positions, and should have no
interests contrary to the interests of the Corporation. This is necessary to
assure that actions taken will be beneficial to the Corporation and that
the possibility of personal gain will not influence the decisions of the
trustees.
The structure of the Corporation should not resemble the composition
of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation where the Admin-
istrator is responsible to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. Here two
countries are involved in the same corporation and the corporation would
function more smoothly with individuals rather than branches of two
governments setting the policy of the corporation.
As mentioned earlier, profits would come from exploration rights
and from royalties if petroleum is discovered. Inasmuch as Venezuela
and Colombia have different levels of taxation on petroleum products it
is suggested that the Venezuelan tax levels be employed. Venezuela's
experience in the petroleum industry has resulted in a sophisticated
petroleum tax structure which would undoubtedly also benefit Colombia.
Colombia has an unemployment problem, and many of its citizens
are willing to work for less money than Venezuelans. Venezuelans are
more skilled in certain aspects of the petroleum industry. The Corpora-
tion should consist of an equal number of Venezuelans and Colombians,
receiving equal compensation. If oil is discovered, the oil companies
should employ equal numbers of Venezuelans and Colombians in com-
parable positions. If it is discovered that there are not enough skilled
Colombians, positions should go to Venezuelans and a training program
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established for Colombians, and only Colombians hired until there is an
equal number of Venezuelans and Colombians in corresponding positions.
The cost of the training program should be borne equally, because Vene-
zuela would be benefiting by having more of its citizens employed during
the period Colombians were being trained. Wages paid by the oil com-
panies should be monitored by the Corporation, and should be equal to
salaries paid in either Venezuela or Colombia-wherever they are higher.
Making the salaries equal to the largest amount paid in Venezuela or in
Colombia would raise the standards of living of employees.
The Corporation should also have an official in charge of its day-to-
day operations in full managerial control of the administration of the
Corporation if oil is discovered. The administrator would be chosen by
the trustees, as is done by the TVA, and his term of office would be
limited to a fixed number of years, at which time a representative of the
other country would be chosen as administrator.
CONCLUSION
Venezuela and Colombia are engaged in a serious border dispute.
It would be to the advantage of both countries to reach a quick settle-
ment, and the sooner a settlement is reached, the sooner exploration and
drilling may begin. Both countries are now reluctant to make concessions
for fear of losing substantial revenues. Negotiations have been going on
for more than seven years without a breakthrough. This paper suggests
the creation of a binational commission to settle as much of the contro-
versy as possible, and thereafter the establishment of a binational cor-
poration to lease exploration rights to foreign oil companies. If oil is
found, the corporation would grant drilling rights to interested companies.
It is submitted that each country should be willing to share profits made
by selling drilling rights, when the alternative might be to get nothing
while the dispute rages on. Even if no oil is found, the corporation will
be profitable because revenue from drilling rights should be greater than
expenses. If oil is discovered, profits will be even greater; if not, it
should prove fairly simple to settle the dispute for the emotions raised
by oil expectations will dissipate.
The above is a novel approach to the settlement of this particular
boundary problem. Its uniqueness should not be a deterrent, for unique
solutions have frequently been used to settle boundary problems, as shown
by the success of the International Joint Commission, the International
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Boundary Commission, the St. Lawrence Seaway Authorities, and the
Rhine and Danube River Commissions. The author believes that tradi-
tional settlement devices of arbitration and negotiation are leading no-
where, and that the two authorities suggested represent a realistic, rational,
relatively simple and acceptable basis for breaking the deadlock, and
moving towards the settlement of a most serious border dispute.
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